Note: This entry has been restored from old archives.
Anyone else get the feeling that the Storm Worm proves that the entire ‘net security industry is useless? We already know that most security is ineffective against targeted attacks, and now Storm makes is clear that the state of security in general is ineffective against widespread attacks. Sure, your AV product will almost certainly protect you from Storm, but it wont protect you from Storm breaking the ‘net in general. The problem is that the fact that you do have an AV product installed and up to date places you in the minority.
OK, implying that we’re all stuffed is rather over the top … but sometimes I really feel rather perturbed by the whole situation.
Anyway, the latest fun fact I’ve noticed regarding the Storm worm is that some security-sensitive sites have started using blacklists to block HTTP clients. At this moment there are several security sites that give me messages like “
ACCESS DENIED” or “
File Not Found or your IP is blocked. Sorry.” but they work perfectly well if I bounce through a remote proxy. Why? Well according to some lists, such as
cbl.abuseat.org, I have a Storm Worm infection. It happens that my ADSL picked up a new dynamic IP this morning that someone with an infection must have had last week. I understand why the websites are doing this, though I’m skeptical of the effectiveness of it as a countermeasure. Being the victim of a DDoS is pretty much worst-case-scenario for a popular site, anything that might reduce your vulnerability is going to look good.
What is the solution? Certainly not this sort of blacklistsing? We probably need to see a shift in the responsibility. The dumb end users can’t be held responsible, would it be a car owner’s fault if his car was stolen and subsequently the thief runs down a child with it? What if the car owner left the car with the engine running while popping into the newsagent to pick up a paper? The child’s death is still not the car owner’s fault I’d say, even if said owner is somewhat foolish. But we don’t know how to hold the thief responsible in the botnet case. The analogy works to describe my case for absolving the user, but breaks down when you look at it for assigning blame to the driver. Are the cars computers, IP addresses, or packets? Who’s the driver? What we do know is that 100% of car thieves are homicidal maniacs! Iieee!
Now, given that there are cars speeding around everywhere being driven by child-killers, roadblocks have been set up all over the place to keep the killer-cars out. Each roadblock has a long list of number-plates to check against approaching cars, the problem is that the list is very large and is always out of date. Some killers will get though (but you may be saved from the DDoS) though you’ll possibly just end up with a huge line of cars at your roadblock (DDoSing your roadblock!). Also keep in mind that the killers who aren’t on the list know that they aren’t and are capable of organising themselves to show up at a given location instantly.
How do we reliably know a bad packet from a good one? Who should be responsible (infrastructure providers need to foot some of this I think). What’s the solution? Buggered if I know 🙂 and if I did I wouldn’t be telling, would I? Let’s hope that some of the large number of smart cookies out there thinking about this come up with something that doesn’t suck! However, I fear that all solutions involve a giant and expensive leap: a new Internet. (Or, at least, a major overhaul of the one we have.) Is that even possible?